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THE TUNISIAN CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSITION 
AND DEBATES: ISLAM, WOMEN AND OTHER 
ACTORS IN THE WAKE OF THE POST 
JASMINE REVOLUTION
         
Ashraf Booley1
ABSTRACT 
The Arab uprising in Tunisia, dubbed the Jasmine Revolution 
began in 2010, protesting against unemployment, corruption, 
injustice and the absence of basic freedoms. The Jasmine 
Revolution ousted Ben Ali, the then president who was in power 
for more than three decades in 2011. Post Jasmine Revolution 
saw Tunisia making commendable strides in its transition 
towards a new all-inclusive democratic political order. However, 
the transition process has not been without obstacles which could 
have had the effect of derailing the transition process, such as the 
assassination of activists Chokri Belaïd and Mohamed Brami, the 
role and place of Islam, the inclusion of women in the political 
transition and the most popular Islamic party Ennahda with 
its rumours of transforming Tunisia into an Islamic state were 
cause for great concern for all. However, despite these concerns, 
Tunisia’s new constitutional text is considered to be a radical 
departure from its previous constitutional texts. After the drafting 
of various drafts, the 2014 constitutional text has attained the 
status in the Middle Eastern And North African Region MENA 
Region as being the most liberal compared to other countries in 
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the Mena Region. The 2014 constitutional provisions protect civil 
liberties, separates legislative, executive and judicial powers, 
guaranteeing women parity in political institutions, and declares 
that Islam is the country’s official religion while at the same 
time protecting religious freedom for all. An important facet is 
the homogeneity of Tunisian society – which although has some 
divisions, did not suffer fragmentation along religious, political, 
cultural or ethnic lines, as is the case in other Muslim states. 
This was accomplished by including all actors not only political 
parties, women’s groups and activists, religious activists, but also 
the various unions which represented the working class in Tunisia. 
The outcome was nothing short of being miraculous, bearing in 
mind the chaos that engulfed Tunisia during this period. One 
could argue that Tunisian listened to its people and advice of all, 
thereby minimising a terrible outcome. 
Keywords: Jasmine revolution, Islam, women, constitution, debates
INTRODUCTION 
The period of December 2010 and January 2011,2 saw Tunisia being 
catapulted onto the world stage, as Tunisian’s flooded the streets in protest 
against unemployment, corruption, injustice, exclusion and the absence of 
basic freedoms.3 The protest managed to oust the then President Zine Abidine 
Ben Ali, who was already in power for the past three decades.4 Although, 
2 It has been commonly acknowledged that the act of self-immolation on 17 
December 2010 of Mohamed Bouazizi sparked the wave of spontaneous protest. 
The root of the protest were decades of repression, injustice, exclusion and the 
absence of basic rights. Tunisians across the divide identified with the act of 
Mohamed Bouazizi. It is believed “Mohamed Bouazizi did not self-immolate to 
as ask for bread, but for the dignity to work which would in turn give him bread”. 
The protests began in the marginalised regions of Sidi Bouzid and Kassrine, in 
central and west central Tunisia. 
3 Zoglin, ‘Tunisia at a Crossroads: Drafting a New Constitution,’ American Society 
of International Law, vol. 17, no. 18 (2013), 1-19.
4 Zine el Abidine Ben Ali ruled Tunisia form November 1987, following the 
removal of the founder of the Tunisian Republic, Habib Bourguiba, through 
what was a so called “medical coup”. The subjugation of human rights by the 
ousted president and his family as well as his entourage lay at the epicentre of the 
problem. To maintain a monopoly on political and economic existence the then 
authorities denied Tunisians there economic, social, civil and political rights. The 
indivisibility of rights became apparent from the very start of the protests. 
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for the past 50 years or so Tunisian lives were controlled by an authoritarian 
government under different presidents. The effect of the Jasmine revolution, 
created an atmosphere which saw Tunisians taking advantage of by setting in 
motion a process of adopting a new constitution and addressing the lacuna of 
fundamental and basic human rights.5
Amongst other important issues, one issue that was contentious was what 
would be the role of Islam in the process of going forward. The role of Islam 
has always been and will be a prominent feature not only in Tunisia, but in 
countries, where the population adhere to the Islamic faith. Not surprisingly, 
after attaining independence, Islam has been declared in all constitutional 
texts as the “religion of the State” and the Arabic language became the official 
language.6 Of interest, was article 38, which states that the -”The President 
of the Republic is the Head of State. His religion shall be Islam”.7 These 
constitutional provisions of earlier text provides the importance of Islam 
in Tunisia. The role of Islam in Tunisia, will become evident as the article 
progresses.
This has become evident in Tunisia that Muslim communities observe 
Islam in their daily lives, as a faith and a way of life which at times is difficult 
to separate.8 Tunisia has been exposed to the so-called Arabo-Islamic influence 
since the 7th century and its national identity has been manifested by this 
civilization and was used as an instrument (there were other organizations that 
assisted) in uniting the country in its struggle for independence against the 
French.9 
Inferences may be drawn from the above, that the role of Islam would 
always attract serious debates, in the process of going forward. Therefore, 
the debates that emanated from the Jasmin revolution came as no surprise 
to those who observed the transitional process. There were debates relating 
to the drafting of a new constitution, for example, various ideological 
divisions between conservative/Islamist and secularist/modernist proponents 
as well as a more technical opposition between scholars/experts, who argue 
5 Proctor & Moussa, ‘The Tunisian Constituent Assembly’s By-laws: A Brief 
Analysis,’ http://www.ndi.org, accessed on 30 September 2018.
6 See The Constitution of Tunisia 1959, Article 1 Tunisia is a free, independent 
and sovereign state. Its religion is Islam, its language is Arabic and its type of 
government is the Republic.
7 The Constitution of Tunisia 1959.
8 Suliman, ‘The First Political Systems in the Independent Maghrib: A Comparative 
Study,’ http://www.iua.edu.sd, accessed on 20 September 2018.
9 Suliman, ‘The First Political Systems in the Independent Maghrib: A Comparative 
Study.’
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for a constitutional text, containing universal guidelines and human rights 
proponents who advocated for a detailed constitution that meticulously puts 
forward human rights provisions, citing the South African constitution and its 
various provisions, especially, Chapter two, its Bill of Rights.10 
Part A - looks at the position and role of Islam and women, during the various 
period of Tunisia. For example, during the pre and post French Protectorate, 
the period of Tunisia’s first president, and the presidency of Ben Ali. Part B 
- describes the constitutional process, participants and dealing with central 
areas of disagreements and agreements during the constitutional transitional 
process. This will not be a comprehensive evaluation of all the aspects of the 
constitutional transitional process that took place in Tunisia.
PART A - A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF TUNISIA, ISLAM AND 
WOMEN
Tunisia was conquered by the advancing forces of Islam during the first half 
of the 7th century when an important garrison was established at Qayrawan in 
the former Roman province of Africa.11 A large part of the Tunisian population 
converted to Islam.12 The type of Islam that was developed in Tunisia was 
grounded in Shariah as interpreted by the more dominant Mālikī and to a 
10 Shaqoura & Kristiansen, ‘Islam and Human Rights: The Constitutional Debate 
in Tunisia,’ The Danish Institute for Human Rights, http:// www.humanrights.dk, 
accessed on 16 October 2018. The Republic of South Africa, Constitution 1996, 
Chapter 2, Bill of Rights. 
11 Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (United Kingdom: Farber & Farber, 2013), 
1-640. The Shariah is the whole body of law, encompassing the teachings of 
various schools of law, the al-Qur’ān, the Sunnah, and legal precedent established 
in individual cases. Islam is a monotheistic religion which sharers its roots and 
some of its core beliefs with Judaism and Christianity. It could be argued that the 
al-Qur’ān was revealed at a time and place in history when patriarchal values 
reigned supreme and its laws in a large part tempered and relieved some of the 
most egregious excesses which then subsisted by creating new regulations for 
society and modifying customary practices. There are five major schools of 
Islamic law: four Sunni and one Shia. The difference between the schools, centre’ 
s on the difference of interpretation of some Quranic verses, disagreements among 
religious scholars on the authenticity of some ḥadīth, dissenting with regard to the 
weight to be given to some legal sources, and differences in opinion as to what is 
required when faced with novel practical situations.
12 Morse & Sayeh, ‘Tunisia: Marriage, Divorce, and Foreign Recognition,’ Family 
Law Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 3 (1995): 701-720.
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lesser extent the Ḥanafī religious schools of thought found in Sunni Islam.13 In 
addition, the Arabic language spread simultaneously with Islam as a spoken 
word in its various dialects influenced by the previous indigenous languages 
whose unity was preserved by the al-Qur’ān, the holy scriptures of Islam, 
revealed to Prophet Muḥammad [PBUH].14 During the second half of the 7th 
century North Africa was engulfed by Muslim Arabs and the result was that the 
roots of Islam became embedded as such.15 As a result of such influences Islam 
in Tunisia has a played a basic and fundamental role in shaping the country, as 
a religion, a culture, identity and a source of law (especially its family law).16 
A case in point is the establishment of the now Al-Zaytuna University.17 
Founded as a madrasah (religious learning school) in the early 7th - 8th century, 
the school flourished during the Middle Ages and evolved into a religious 
university, along with theology, although focussing mainly the teaching of the 
al-Qur’ān, the university also taught jurisprudence, history, grammar, science 
and medicine.18 Alongside Cairo’s Al-Azhar Univeristy, the Al-Zaytuna was 
considered to be on par in terms of being recognised as a leading Islamic 
educational institute in the MENA Region, although this is debated amongst 
various scholars.19 In Tunisia, public habous (a type of ownership, which 
13 Charrad MM, ‘Policy Shifts: State, Islam, and Gender in Tunisia, 1930s-1990s,’ 
Social Politics (1997): 284-319. 
14 Charrad MM, ‘Policy Shifts: State, Islam, and Gender in Tunisia, 1930s-1990s,’ 
284-319. It is customary for the words Peace and Blessings Upon Him [PBUH] to 
follow.
15 Islam is part of more than one billion people’s lives. Its legacy spans more than 
fourteen centuries, and today Islam is the fastest growing religion on Earth. The 
Islamic faith has contributed to a multiplicity of cultures, languages, and peoples, 
and has taken part in every major human endeavour, from anatomy to philosophy. 
For all of its varieties, one characteristic shared by all followers of the Islamic 
creed is an adherence to a divinely inspired law-an Islamic law, the Shariah. 
16 Proctor & Moussa, ‘The Tunisian Constituent Assembly’s By-laws: A Brief 
Analysis.’ During the colonial period, women were marginalized and secluded, 
there was not much access to education, economic activity was largely confined 
to the domain of the home, wearing of the veil was practiced. In addition, public 
participation in public life was reduced to a minimum.
17 Ez-Zitouna Mosque or Ezzitouna Mosque or Mosque of El-Zituna (Arabic: جامع 
 literally meaning the Mosque of Olive) one of two major mosques , الزيتونة
in Tunis, Tunisia.
18 Croitoru, ‘Controversy Surrounding the Al-Zaytuna in Tunis: The Ambivalent 
Revival of Islamic Traditions,’ http://en.qatana.de, accessed on 17 January 2019. 
19 Croitoru, ‘Controversy Surrounding the Al-Zaytuna in Tunis: The Ambivalent 
Revival of Islamic Traditions.’
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can be public, private or mixed) was introduced for the funding of religious 
organizations and public institutions such as schools, mosques and hospitals.20 
The property habous or waqf is an institution entirely original, invented by 
Islamic law.21 The legal institutions are described as property waqf, mainly in 
the laws of the Middle East and as goods and property habous in the Maghreb 
region.22
Tunisia’s early history reveals, a reformist movement led by Arab and 
Muslim scholars arguing for reforms of the existing legal systems seen by 
the movement as inferior to Western legal systems. In 1857 Ahmed Bey’s 
successor, Mohamed Bey (1855-59), issued the so-called Fundamental Pact,23 
which spelled out the principles regulating relations between the Bey and 
his subjects and foreigners residing in Tunisia. The document, dictated to 
the beylicate by the French consul in Tunis, also allowed foreigners to own 
property in Tunisia and guaranteed them equal protection under the law. The 
Fundamental Pact paved the way for the appointment of Kherredin Pasha, a 
Circassian Mamluk with long service in Tunisia and the son-in-law of Mustafa 
Khaznader, to draw up a constitution.24 
ISLAM, WOMEN AND THE FRENCH PROTECTORATE 
The French occupied North Africa in later part of the 1800’s, establishing a 
protectorate from 1881-1956 by way of a treaty, rather than outright conquest 
20 Habous Encyclopedia.com, http://www.encyclopedia.com, accessed on 5 January 
2019. It has been recorded in a ḥadīth that ‘Umar Ibn al-Khaṭṭāb asked Prophet 
Muḥammad [PBUH], what, could he do with his lad to please Allah SWT. The 
Prophet declared: “Immobilize it so that it cannot be sold, donated, inherited and 
distributed to the poor”. ‘Umar Ibn al-Khaṭṭāb followed this advice and declared 
that the land in question could not be subject, in the future, of a sale or donation. 
In other words, it is well placed out of the sphere of commerce and safe from any 
alienation because of its purpose of general interest. 
21 Khalfoune T., ‘Le Harbous le domaine public et le trust,’ Revue internationale de 
droit comparé, vol. 57, no. 2 (2005): 441-470.
22 Khalfoune T., ‘Le Harbous le domaine public et le trust,’ 441-470. 
23 The Fundamental Pact (‘ahd al-aman in Arabic) was issued in Tunis in 1857. It 
was legally adopted as the country’s constitution in 1861, at which point it became 
the first written constitution in the Arab World.
24 The Constitution of Tunisia 1861.
The Tunisian Constitutional Transition and Debates: Islam, Women 
and Other Actors in the Wake of the Post Jasmine Revolution
299
by the French.25 Tunisia retained its indigenous system of government with the 
Bey holding power. Although, commercial and legal infrastructures of Tunisia 
was appropriated by the French, French citizens residing in Tunisia falling 
under the French statut personnel, the laws governing the personal status of 
Tunisian nationals continued to be Muslim Laws which had taken root.26
Unlike most Arab countries, Tunisia boasted a long and distinguished 
history, which reflected a tradition of physical and social unity.27 Before Tunisia 
fell under the protectorate of the French, it celebrated a legacy of geographical 
continuity, religious and linguistic homogeneity including comparative social 
solidarity.28 As Micaud, observed that, “when the French occupation started in 
1881, Tunisia had long been a unified country, possessing all the institutions of 
a viable society - it did not have to discover that it was a state”.29 Islam became 
inviolate in the family law sphere.30 Charrad, a legal scholar argues that Islam 
25 Tunisia - The French Protectorate (1881-1956), http://www.britannica.com, 
accessed on 5 January 2019. Officially, the Bey remained an absolute monarchy. 
Tunisian ministers were still appointed government structures preserved and 
Tunisian’s continued to be subjects of the Bey. The French did not dismantle 
existing institutions, maintaining instead the degree of self-rule established by the 
Turkish monarchs, referred to as the Beys. 
26 Morse & Sayeh, ‘Tunisia: Marriage, Divorce, and Foreign Recognition,’ 701-720.
27 Entilis, ‘Reformist Ideaology in the Arab World: The Case of Tunisia and 
Lebanon,’ The Review of Politics, vol. 37, no. 4 (1957): 526.
28 Entilis, ‘Reformist Ideaology in the Arab World: The Case of Tunisia and 
Lebanon,’ 526.
29 Micaud, ‘Tunisia’s Foreign Policy: Independence and Development,’ Africa 
Today: African Non-Alignment and Foreign Policies, vol. 15, no. 6 (1968-1969): 
12-15.
30 Shariah is an Arabic word that means the “path to be followed”, referring to a 
number of legal injunctions. The intricacies of ethical, moral and religious raw 
materials derived from the primary sources of Islam, were given shape and 
direction by Islamic jurists during the second and third centuries of the Islamic 
calendar. The Sunni Muslims trace their jurisprudential descent through the first 
four ‘Umayyad caliphs and was principally the work of four jurists; Abū Ḥanīfah, 
Mālik Ibn Ānas, Muḥammad Ibn Idris al-Shāfi‘ī and Ahmad Ḥanbāl. The Imams, 
or founders developed separate schools during the great period of theological 
interpretation that occurred after the demise of Muḥammad. The various schools 
have been named after their founders, namely, Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shāfi‘ī and Ḥanbalī. 
No one school of thought enjoys universal dominance, however, and in Morocco 
and Tunisia, for example, the Mālikī school is the most influential, whereas in 
Egypt, the Ḥanafī school appears to be the most popular. There are other schools 
found in Sunni Islam, which are less dominant. 
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came into a society where kin groups functioned as corporate units in which 
males (fathers, sons and husbands) possessed control over women (mothers, 
daughters and wives).31
The Tunisian population under colonial rule believed that being Tunisian 
included having allegiance to Islam.32 Therefore, Tunisian’s viewed Islam as a 
cornerstone of their separate identity from the French.33 As with any colonised 
country interference with its religious laws had the potential to erupt into 
civil disobedience. Therefore, the French did not intervene and Islam was left 
intact as well as its family law with all its restrictions, and served as a point 
of distinction between Tunisians and the French. Although the French limited 
its interference in Islamic domain, the French changed other laws, such as, 
property and contract law.34
In the 1920s and 1930s, as the struggle intensified, voices surfaced for 
greater gender equality.35 Only a limited amount of women publicly denounced 
their confinement, illiteracy, subservient position in the family and imposing 
marriages, although their calls went relatively unanswered.36 In the late forties, 
some prominent Tunisian jurists thought that a fusion of the Mālikī and Ḥanafī 
religious schools of thought a codified code of personal status could be created, 
conforming with social changes in the country.37 These jurists prepared a 
comparative account of the law as it stood under the two religious schools of 
31 Charrad MM, ‘Policy Shifts: State, Islam, and Gender in Tunisia, 1930s-1990s,’ 
284-319. 
32 Charrad MM, ‘Policy Shifts: State, Islam, and Gender in Tunisia, 1930s-1990s,’ 
284-319.
33 Charrad MM, ‘Policy Shifts: State, Islam, and Gender in Tunisia, 1930s-1990s,’ 
284-319.
34 The reasons included economic and political considerations. Economic exploitation, 
which was primarily interested the French, made changes in commercial law 
critical, whereas it did not require similar changes in Islamic law. Other colonies 
such as Algeria experienced more extensive settlements of individual farmers with 
small holdings.
35 Salem, ‘Tunisia,’ www.freedomhouse.org, accessed on 3 January 2019.
36 The first women’s associations, the Tunisian Women’s Islamic Union, was created 
in 1936. Women went on to participate in the fight for independence, and slowly 
affirmed their place in society. By 1956, nationalist leader Habib Bourguiba’s 
speeches were emphasizing that the development of the country depended on the 
participation of everyone, women and men alike.
37 Chusanayaini, ‘Dynamics of Tunisian Polygamy Law in Gender Perspective,’ 
media.netili.com, accessed on 2 May 2020.
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thought and published under the title Laihat Majallat al-Ahkam al Syar’iyyah 
(Draft Law Islamic Law).38
During the fight for independence, Bourguiba, was aware of the place, 
of Islam and women which was by that time firmly entrenched in Tunisian 
society. Realising that, Bourguiba, saw Islam and women’s organizations and 
struggles as a powerful instrument for mobilising the masses, for example, 
he used Islamic institutions and symbols and the calls of women (relating to 
gender equality as blocks to build a strong following.39 
ISLAM, WOMEN AND HABIB BOURGUIBA 
In the early 1960’s, Bourguiba in line with his secularists policies closed the Al- 
Zaytuna mosque, one the leading traditional religious institutions in Tunisia.40 
Henceforth, Islam, as a subject was taught at the neighbouring Al-Zaytuna 
University, named after the mosque, under severe supervision of the newly 
enacted state.41 It could be argued, that this action was central to long term 
implications in levelling the field when it came to interpretation of Tunisia’s 
Islamic law.42 The ideology was that the modern university would produce 
scholars in the fields of humanities and social sciences who would focus on 
38 Later, the government set up a committee under the supervision by the Shaik of 
Islam of the country, Muhammad al-Ja’it, to officially draft the code. Shaik of 
the Zaytunah University, Tahir bin ‘Ashur also participated in the committee’s 
deliberations. The committee submitted to the government the draft of the code 
of personal status. It was eventually enacted under the title Majallat al-Ahwal al- 
Syakhsiyyah (Code of Personal Statutes) in 1956-1957.
39 Bourguiba’s PSD party held meetings in mosques and zawiyas (meeting places or 
corners) and urged people to pray five times a day for national martyrs. Bourguiba’s 
title al mujahid al akbar (the great warrior) held a popular mystique as he led the 
people forward in jihād (holy war) against the French.
40 Having been declared president for life by the national legislature in 1975, the 
aging Supreme Combatant presides over a nation that is in the process of cultural, 
social, economic, and political transition. Founded as a madrasah (Islamic learning 
school) as early as the beginning of the 8th century, the school developed in the late 
Middle Ages into a religious university. The literal meaning of Al-Zaytuna is the 
mosque of Olive.
41 Croitoru, ‘Controversy Surrounding the Al-Zaytuna in Tunis: The Ambivalent 
Revival of Islamic Traditions.’
42 Tais, ‘Islamic Perspectives in Post-revolutionary Tunisia,’ Journal of Religion & 
Society, vol. 17 (2015): 1-12.
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various elements of Islam, which would go beyond the limits of the more 
traditional perspectives.43 Alongside Cairo’s prestigious Al-Azhar University, 
the Al-Zaytuna University was considered to be on par when it came to Islamic 
education, although this is debated amongst scholars.44
In the early 1960’s Bourguiba in line with his secularists policies closed 
the Al- Zaytuna mosque.45 Henceforth, Islam, as a subject was taught at the 
neighbouring Al-Zaytuna University, named after the mosque, under severe 
supervision and restrictions of the newly enacted republican state.46 Bourguiba, 
aims for Tunisia was the creation of a modern state according to the ideals 
of the French revolution.47 Themes such as progress, rationality and human 
dignity were titled Bourguibism (a term echoed by French journalists to 
describe Bourguiba’s philosophy).48 Bourguiba did not address himself as a 
secular reformer as the then Kemal Ataturk of Turkey. Instead, he portrayed 
himself as a modernist reformer he said “our concern” is to return to religion 
to its dynamic quality.49 Being sensitive to the Islamic character of the country, 
he was well aware that religious custom and belief was the foundation of 
Muslims in Tunisia.50 During the Bourguiba period the role of Islam played a 
powerful political tool and as such was used as a legitimate factor to mobilise 
the masses.51
The most controversial component of modernity - and the one which 
underpins the workings of Bourguiba52 on an internal level - has been changes 
43 Tais, ‘Islamic Perspectives in Post-revolutionary Tunisia,’ 1-12.
44 Both institutions are well known for its moderate line and famous graduates such 
as the Arab historian Ibn Khaldun.
45 Founded as a madrasah (Islamic learning school) as early as the beginning of the 
8th century, the school developed in the late Middle Ages into a religious university. 
The literal meaning of Al-Zaytuna is the mosque of Olive.
46 Croitoru, ‘Controversy Surrounding the Al-Zaytuna in Tunis: The Ambivalent 
Revival of Islamic Traditions.’
47 Boulby, ‘The Islamic Challenge: Tunisia since Independence,’ Third World 
Quaterly, vol. 10, no. 2 (1998): 591.
48 Boulby, ‘The Islamic Challenge: Tunisia since Independence,’ 591. 
49 Boulby, ‘The Islamic Challenge: Tunisia since Independence,’ 591.
50 Boulby, ‘The Islamic Challenge: Tunisia since Independence,’ 591.
51 During the fight for independence, Bourguiba’s PSD party used Islamic institutions 
and symbols creatively to attract a mass support base.
52 Habib Bourguiba was referred to as a child of enlightenment, educated in law and 
political science at the Sorbonne. Bourguiba, took his political inspiration from 
Rousseau, Lamartine and Hugo.
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relating to the role played by Islam. Following independence in 1956, the 
emerging Tunisian authorities implemented a series of legal reforms that 
formed Tunisia’s legal system in its current form. Under Tunisia’s first post-
independent president, Habib Bourguiba, set in motion a series of changes 
relating to Islam, for example the codification of its family law and the 
abolishment of Shariah Courts, various tribunals and French courts.53 The 
judiciary became unified and Tunisian law applied to all persons within 
the country. It could very well be argued that the existing French law acted 
as a basis for certain of the reforms, particularly, civil law.54 This is hardly 
surprising, as Bourguiba was a graduate of the Sorbonne University. 
In creating a modern Tunisia, the Bourguiba led government introduced a 
notable policy the codification of its family law the Code of Personal Status 
(CPS) in 1956 - 1957.55 The codification of Tunisia’s family law offended many 
orthodox Muslims as they viewed the CPS as a direct attack against Islam.56 
The aim of the CPS was to improve the legal position of women by reforming 
Tunisia’s existing family law (which was at that time not codified), which was 
in the hands of Muslim clerics under the French Protectorate. Polygamy was 
banned and the code required that a man could no longer obtain a divorce by 
merely renouncing his wife without the intervention of judicial authority of 
the state.57 Although some of the Muslim clerics immediately issued a fatwa 
53 Proctor & Moussa, ‘The Tunisian Constituent Assembly’s By-laws: A Brief 
Analysis.’
54 One of the central aims of Borguiba’s modernity was the reforms relating to 
education. The educational reforms relating to the ‘ulamā’ (Muslim clerics) was 
profound. Unification of the education system meant the elimination of religious 
schools and Zaytouna scholars were deprived of their traditional role as teachers. 
The Zaytouna Mosque was integrated into the newly created Tunis University 
featuring a western-style curriculum. Religious education was reduced to only two 
hours per week. Although job opportunities were created for Zaytouna graduates 
as religious educators, the content as well as method of religious instructions were 
controlled by the state. 
55 Mashour, ‘Islamic Law and Gender Equality: Could There Be A Common 
Ground?: A Study of Divorce and Polygamy in Sharia Law and Gender Equality,’ 
Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 2 (2005): 566. 
56 Boulby, ‘The Islamic Challenge: Tunisia since Independence,’ 591. 
57 The Tunisian Code of Personal Status of 1956, Book 1, article 18. Marrying 
more than one woman shall incur punishment of one imprisonment and a affine 
of 240 000 francs or either of these. In addition, arguing that polygyny that the 
Qur’anic verse requiring the equal treatment of wives was an impossible ideal. 
Furthermore, polygyny could be equated to slavery and should be prohibited as the 
practice was revealed in a special context at the time of revelation. 
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(religious decree) putting forward their own legal position denouncing the 
CPS, several clerics not only approved the new policy but accepted positions 
as judges defending the CPS in the newly established secular courts.58 This 
was in effect a top-down policy by the government, when at a time the feminist 
movement was not as solidified as it is now in Tunisia. Furthermore, it could 
be argued that the introduction and codification of family law was to break 
the existing stranglehold that Muslim clerics and tribal leaders in the rural 
areas held onto, instead of the emancipation and improvement of the status of 
women in Tunisia. 
ISLAM, WOMEN AND BEN ALI 
From the mid-1940s to the 1970’s as in many Muslim dominated societies, 
religion was controlled by the state. It is reported that only after this period 
that an Islamist59 movement revival becoming visible in direct response to 
the implementation of state policies, envisaging and overall programme and 
language of political control of issues such as religion, social, economic and 
cultural life of Muslim living in Muslim countries.60
In 1987, the then Prime Minister Ben Ali,61 declared a sitting president 
Bourguiba mentally and physically incompetent to hold the presidency and 
58 Shults, ‘Tunisia: Democracy and Islam in post-Arab Spring Politics,’ http://
scholar.utc.edu/honors-thesis, accessed on 13 October 2018.
59 Simply explained, Islamism, or political Islam, accords Islam as a political 
movement encapsulating religious beliefs together with political ideologies. 
According to Rodger Hardy, political Islam is the notion that Islam is not only a 
religion and a way of life but an all-encompassing political and social ideology. 
Therefore, Islamist parties are normally characterised by a urge to afford Qur’anic 
principles into existing legislation, which not limited to radical and conservative 
Shariah. Islamism it is argued to have sprung its roots during the colonial period and 
conceptualised in Egypt during the British period of colonialism in a bid to unite 
Egyptians through the use of religion against the British. It sought to assimilate the 
seventh century period of Prophet Muḥammad [Peace and Blessings Upon Him] 
in Medina. The Islamism movement objective was unite those Muslims who were 
oppressed during the colonial period by the colonial masters. 
60 Proctor & Moussa, ‘The Tunisian Constituent Assembly’s By-laws: A Brief 
Analysis.’ 
61 Ben Ali ruled Tunisia for 23 years and ended with the “Jasmine Revolution”. 
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took over the office in a bloodless coup d’ état.62 A notable feature of the Ben 
Ali presidency was characterised by repressive control and persecution of 
political opponents and various religious groupings.63 For example, Ennahda 
a middle-of the-road influential Islamist party which was formed in 1981 was 
banned because of its Islamic agenda and many took refuge abroad evading 
the Ben Ali presidency.64 From the above it may be argued that the restricting 
of political participation and freedom of expression was a mechanism that was 
employed by the then Ben Ali presidency to maintain power and quashing 
any political opposition.65 As far as Islam was concern, and in particular the 
CPS, minimal changes were introduced and these were by and large seen as 
insignificant from the perspectives of gender equality, however, these changes 
served as a further break from the traditional Shariah according to Charrad.66
During the Ben Ali term, women’s trajectory relating to education and 
economic empowerment continued. In 1991, reforms to the educational 
system made attendance for both girls and boys from the ages of 16 years 
compulsory, result in a dramatic increase in the enrolment rates at secondary 
schools.67 Today, the enrolment figures at universities show more females than 
males, and women constitute 27.9 percent of the labour as at 2007.68 Sadly, 
inequity exists, particularly in rural settings, where women hardly own land 
and are overwhelmed by having to balance both domestic and farm activities.69 
Furthermore, in the private sector, women are not often promoted to managerial 
positions, and in most instances earn less than men in the same position.70
62 Omri, ‘The Status of Women under Tunisian Law,’ Journal of Policy Studies, vol. 
18 (2004): 147-161.
63 Proctor & Moussa, ‘The Tunisian Constituent Assembly’s By-laws: A Brief 
Analysis.’ 
64 Arieff, ‘Political Transition in Tunisia Congressional Research Service Report for 
Congress,’ http://www.refwold.org, accessed on 14 October 2018. 
65 Khalil, ‘Tunisia’s Women: Partners in Revolution,’ Journal of North African 
Studies, vol. 19, no. 2 (2014): 192.
66 Charrad, ‘Tunisia at the Forefront of the Arab World: Two Waves of Gender 
Legislation,’ Washington and Lee Law Review, vol. 64, no. 4 (2007): 1527.
67 Salem, ‘Tunisia.’
68 Salem, ‘Tunisia.’ 
69 Salem, ‘Tunisia.’
70 Salem, ‘Tunisia.’
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According to Shults, these changes afforded Ben Ali the support of the 
West through its secular practices and demonstrating that the Islamist parties 
were towing the line in Tunisia.71 Some may argue that restricting political 
participation of parties and other measures that were put in place was decidedly 
undemocratic, would be correct. It is however, against this imperious regime 
of Ben Ali that created the space for protest of the Arab spring and the ensuing 
road to a more democratic and participatory environment for Tunisia. It could 
very well be argued that Tunisia under the Ben Ali regime saw the country 
lapse into state of authoritarianism.72 Islamic activists after the Arab-uprising 
initiated an organisation called the “Friends of the Al-Zaytuna Mosque” its 
aim was to re-establishing the closed institution.73 After the mobilisations of 
the masses, and petitions, the organisation obtained a court order giving the 
organisation the right to re-open the Al-Zaytuna mosque.74
PART B - THE TUNISIAN CONSTITUTIONAL MAKING PROCESS – 
CONTEXT, PROCESS AND PARTICIPANTS
The Fundamental Pact, (ʿahd al-aman in Arabic) which was promulgated in 
Tunisia in 1857, was legally adopted as the country’s constitution in 1861, 
at which point it became the first written constitution in the Arab World. 
Ebrahim Afsah argues that constitutional struggles in the Arab world are often 
explained by a lack of institutional tradition. Therefore, the long history of 
constitutionalism in Tunisia could help explain the relative success of the 
country’s democratic transition, as compared with other Middle Eastern and 
North African countries that experienced protest to a larger or lesser degree.
The protest that Tunisia, experienced could be attributed to its authoritarian 
government. A notable feature of such governments is the lack of free and 
fair elections as well as the imposition of various restrictions imposed on 
the formation and well-being of political parties.75 Tunisia had few if any 
71 Shults, ‘Tunisia: Democracy and Islam in post-Arab Spring Politics.’ 
72 Majalla’s Notes, ‘Islamism in the Maghreb: Taming Islamists by Integrating Them 
Into the Political System,’ http://facebook.com, accessed on 26 September 2018.
73 Croitoru, ‘Controversy Surrounding the Al-Zaytuna in Tunis: The Ambivalent 
Revival of Islamic Traditions.’ 
74 Croitoru, ‘Controversy Surrounding the Al-Zaytuna in Tunis: The Ambivalent 
Revival of Islamic Traditions.’
75 Dewey, Kaden, Marks, Matsushima & Zhu, ‘The Impact of Social Media on 
Social Unrest in the Arab Spring,’ http://www.publicpolicystanford., accessed on 
5 January 2019.
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institutional mechanisms designed to identify and to respond to the demands 
of protests. The lack of the appropriate feedback mechanisms that has the 
ability of advising the government and the seriousness of the discontent of 
the protesters render those governments incapable of identifying and taking 
appropriate action in a timely manner.76 In addition, such governments, may 
lack transparency and provide little respect for the rule of law and human 
rights principles. The atmosphere in Tunisia could characterised by detentions 
and arrest without due process, torture, trails without substantive procedures in 
place and disappearances.77 Under an authoritarian style government, instances 
of mass protests and political opposition could be curtailed or simply brushed 
aside.78
The effect of the post-Jasmine revolution resulted in an almost vacuum at 
this stage of the process in Tunisia. With the Ben Ali presidency (including the 
ruling party to which he belonged) being forced out as well as dismembered, the 
formerly banned parties started a process of acknowledgment.79 From January 
2011 Tunisia entered a transition period towards democracy. In contrast to 
independence which was largely a national movement, the Jasmine revolution 
in Tunisia was not led by a singular movement or party but rather ignited by 
Tunisians frustration and led mostly by the youth whose anger stemmed by a 
lack of opportunities and the absence of the most basic of fundamental human 
rights. 
In an attempt to occupy the political vacuum, Ben Ali’s Prime Minister 
Mohammad Ghanouchi, based on article 56 of the Tunisian constitution of 
1959, declared himself as acting president.80 However, the application of 
article 56 was interpreted as the absence of the President is temporary, not 
76 Dewey, Kaden, Marks, Matsushima & Zhu, ‘The Impact of Social Media on Social 
Unrest in the Arab Spring.’
77 Dewey, Kaden, Marks, Matsushima & Zhu, ‘The Impact of Social Media on Social 
Unrest in the Arab Spring.’
78 Dewey, Kaden, Marks, Matsushima & Zhu, ‘The Impact of Social Media on Social 
Unrest in the Arab Spring.’
79 The Ben Ali regime came to an end on the 14th January 2011.
80 The Tunisian Constitution of 1959, article 56, Temporary Disability, which 
reads; (1) In the case of temporary disability, the President of the Republic may, 
by decree, delegate his powers to the Prime Minister with the exclusion of the 
power of dissolution, (2) During the temporary disability of the President of the 
Republic, the Government, even if it is the object of motion of censure, remains in 
place until the end of this disability, (3) The President of the Republic shall inform 
the President of the President of the Chamber of Deputies and the President of the 
Chamber of Advisors regarding such temporary delegation of his powers.
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permanent. However, this issue was resolved by the constitutional council, 
being the highest arbiter relating to constitutional issues then. The constitutional 
council81 pronounced that due to the absence of the president the situation 
requires intervention of article 57, therefore, the head of the lower chamber of 
parliament, not the prime minister, should serve as interim president.82 
The interim government set about handling the new Tunisia by installing 
the High Commission for the Realization of Revolutionary Goals, Political 
Reform, and Democratic Transition.83 Inference may be drawn from the title 
that the objectives were to accommodate the demands of the current socio-
political paradigms.84 Due to the deaths of protesters, Mebazza, set in motion a 
road map as well as the date for the election of a National Constituent Assembly 
(NCA) that would be tasked with the drafting of Tunisia’ new constitution as 
well as putting aside the 45-60 day constitutional limit85 relating to his term 
as interim president.86 The interim president further proclaimed that 1959 
constitution no longer meets the needs of the people after the uprising,87 clearing 
the road for the Decree-Law No. 2011-14 to put aside the 1959 constitution 
permanently.88 The High Commission, surprisingly, was initially instituted to 
act in an advisory capacity however the High Commission assume more power 
and unofficially acted as an unelected parliament.89 
81 The Tunisian Constitution of 1959, article 75.
82 The Tunisian Constitution of 1959, article 57. Accordingly, Fouad Mebazza, was 
installed as interim president of the Tunisia. 
83 Nouira, ‘Obstacles on the Path of Tunisia’s Democratic Transformation,’ Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org, accessed on 
12 October 2018.
84 El-Sayed, ‘Post-Revolution Constitutionalism: the Impact of Drafting Process on 
the Constitutional Documents in Tunisia and Egypt,’ Electronic Journal of Islamic 
and Middle Eastern Law, vol. 2 (2014): 39-62. The commissions initial role was 
establishing a platform for the representation on the various role players and the 
Tunisia community. 
85 The Tunisian Constitution of 1959, article 57.
86 BBC News, ‘The Tunisian President Fouad Mebazza Calls Election,’ http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east, accessed on 10 October 2018.
87 BBC News, ‘The Tunisian President Fouad Mebazza Calls Election.’
88 El-Sayed, ‘Post-Revolution Constitutionalism: the Impact of Drafting Process on 
the Constitutional Documents in Tunisia and Egypt,’ 39-62.
89 El-Sayed, ‘Post-Revolution Constitutionalism: the Impact of Drafting Process on 
the Constitutional Documents in Tunisia and Egypt,’ 39-62.
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The NCA was elected in October 2010 with a nearly 70 percent turnout.90 
Ennahda, seen as a moderate Islamic party, attained numerous votes (41.7 
percent) and seats (89 of 217), this however did not represent a majority.91 A 
coalition government92 was formed, comprising the following parties, Ennahda 
(the main winner of the elections), the Centre Nationalist party (CPR Congrés 
pour la République) and the socialist party Ettakatol (Forum démocrtique 
pour le travail et les libertés), at the helm was Mustapha Ben Jafaar, chairman 
of the NCA.93
To include strong women participation, the NCA, imposed that every other 
candidate on the relevant electoral form had to be a woman.94 Surprisingly 
Ennahda, showed extreme willingness to gender-parity, trumping other secular 
parties that had been allotted seats in the NCA. Although it could be argued 
that certain structures were in place to ensure the participation of women, 
even so, the commitment by the Ennahda party to gender-parity demonstrated 
a willingness to compromise.
The NCA basic goal was tasked with the drafting of a new constitution for 
Tunisia in addition its powers were expansive in that it could decide its own 
90 Proctor & Moussa, ‘The Tunisian Constituent Assembly’s By-laws: A Brief 
Analysis.’
91 Proctor & Moussa, ‘The Tunisian Constituent Assembly’s By-laws: A Brief 
Analysis.’
92 The elections to the NCA were based on a system of pure proportional 
representation thus this system worked against majoritarianism and in a favour 
of a coalition. The result was an NCA that included 19 different parties and 8 
independent representatives. Modern day scholars of electoral theory agree that 
had a ‘first-past-the-post’ system had been engaged, the Islamist Ennahda party 
would have won up to 90 percent of the seats - rather than the 41 percent they 
finally achieved. As it was, the Ennahda party was to certain degree forced into 
forming a coalition with various secular parties.
93 Proctor & Moussa, ‘The Tunisian Constituent Assembly’s By-laws: A Brief 
Analysis.’ 
94 Böckenförde, ‘The Dynamics of Comprehensive Constitution-building: Religion 
and the Concept of Twin Tolerations in Tunisia,’ The Tunisian Constitutional 
Process: Main Actors and Key Issues, ed. Mathieu Rousselin & Christopher Smith 
(Duisberg: Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for Global Cooperation Research, 
2015), 24-35.
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by-laws as well governing the country through the transitional period.95 The 
NCA was compartmentalized into six constituent commissions, each have a 
role in drafting a specific part of the new constitution. The first five constituent 
commissions were tasked with the preamble and fundamental principles, 
local government entities, rights and freedoms, executive and legislative 
powers including their relations and justice and constitutional bodies.96 The 
sixth commission essentially a drafting and synthesis was tasked with the 
consolidation of efforts of the other commissions into a harmonised document.97 
In 2012 the drafting of Tunisia’s new constitution in all earnest began, 
following the conclusion of all internal structures of the NCA. As expected, 
with any new process relating to a constitution heated debates ensured on 
issues such as, state identity, the role of religion in state and society, the 
political system, the place of human rights and the role of women.98 As would 
be expected, all participants had divergent views on the above-mentioned 
issues, however, the members of the NCA managed to reach an agreement on 
a variety of issues, such as, article 1 of the old constitution, which states the 
identity of the state and postulates Islam as the religion of the state as well as 
identifying Shariah as a main source of law, as formerly demanded by a few 
Islamist participants.99 
In August 2012, the various constitutional commissions submitted each 
their first draft to the drafting committee, which highlighted issues such as 
repetitions, gaps, vague phrasing, however, no substantive modifications to 
95 Given the scope of powers awarded to the NCA, this body became extremely 
powerful lacking clear limitations and the discharge of such powers. It became 
apparent, that the make-up of the NCA developed two foreseeable mistakes 
firstly drafting a constitution based on political authority and not consensualism, 
secondly, the absence of any criteria relating to accountability. This in contrast that 
the political parties agreed that the mandate of the NCA should not exceed a period 
of one year, however, the agreement was non-binding and many assumed that it 
will not be honoured. 
96 Shaqoura & Kristiansen, ‘Islam and Human Rights: The Constitutional Debate in 
Tunisia.’
97 Shaqoura & Kristiansen, ‘Islam and Human Rights: The Constitutional Debate in 
Tunisia.’
98 Shaqoura & Kristiansen, ‘Islam and Human Rights: The Constitutional Debate in 
Tunisia.’
99 Shaqoura & Kristiansen, ‘Islam and Human Rights: The Constitutional Debate in 
Tunisia.’
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the content of the articles took place.100 Between then and the final adoption of 
the text in January 2014, a further three variants were published for comment 
and redesign. The overall objective was to formalise the new constitution 
with in a period of one year, unfortunately the process continued well beyond 
the proposed deadline of October 2012.101 The constitutional process was 
further delayed with the assassination of Chokri Belaid, a leading politician 
in February 2013, as well as Mohamed Brahmi, a less influential liberal.102 
The second assassination led to sixty NCA members to resign which caused 
and uneasiness in NCA.103 In 2013, two years after the election of the NCA, 
a stimulus was ignited to unite the various factions and to bring end to the 
stalemate that came about with the second assassination. Throughout the 
constitutional process, civil society played a dominant role in monitoring the 
process and the voicing of opinions. The observatory referred to as Marsad 
concentrated on the monitoring of the debates within the NCA, civil society 
and was vocal about the rights of women whereas the broader public followed 
these debates on various social platforms.104 
Due the existing stalemate, prompted Tunisia’s oldest civil participants to 
amalgamate in an effort to forward the constitutional process which ultimately 
was the finalisation thereof.105 They would become known as ‘the quartet’, the 
General Tunisian Union of Work (UGTT), the Tunisian Union of Industry, 
the Commerce and Crafts (UTICA), the Tunisian League of Human Rights 
(LTDH) and the National Organisation of Tunisian Lawyers (ONAT).106 The 
100 The Carter Center, ‘The Carter Congratulates Tunisia’s National Constituent 
Assembly on Final Draft of Constitution and Urges Safeguards for Human Rights,’ 
http://cartercenter.org, accessed on 2 October 2018.
101 Shaqoura & Kristiansen, ‘Islam and Human Rights: The Constitutional Debate in 
Tunisia.’ 
102 Shults, ‘Tunisia: Democracy and Islam in post-Arab Spring Politics.’ An extremist 
conservative group, Ansar al-Sharia was blamed for both deaths. 
103 El-Sayed, ‘Post-Revolution Constitutionalism: the Impact of Drafting Process on 
the Constitutional Documents in Tunisia and Egypt,’ 39-62.
104 Marsad, http://www.marsad.tn/fr/, accessed on 3 October 2018.
105 Schäfer, ‘The Tunisian Transition: Torn Between Democratic Consolidation 
and Neo-Conservatism in an Insecure Regional Context,’ European Institute of 
the Mediterranean, http://www.die-gdi.ide, accessed on 19 October 2018. On 9 
October 2015, the Nobel Prize Committee announced the Tunisian Quartet as the 
winner of the Nobel Peace Prize.
106 All four organisations existed under the Ben Ali’s presidency and in particular 
the UGTT and UICA were accustomed at meeting at the negotiating table and 
partaking in the social discourse before the Arab uprising.
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quartet operated outside the realm of the NCA even when inside the NCA it 
did not seem that consensus would be reached and that the finalisation of the 
constitution would not be attained.107 At first, Ennahda party leadership refused 
to acknowledge the legitimacy of the quartet, arguing that Ennahda and its 
political allies were victorious in the elections, whereas the quartet was seen 
as a group of self-appointed civil society leaders.108 It could be argued that 
Ennahda and others viewed the quartet without have legitimacy, as the quartet 
did not participate in the elections. However, as the protest swelled in Tunisia 
coupled with the removal of Egypt’s Morsi as well as observers around the 
world, Ennadha and other political allies agreed to put their differences aside 
and to put on track the constitutional process.109
So far, we have looked at the internal participants of the constitutional 
process in Tunisia, in addition there were also other international participants 
that played a role in this process. From an international perspective, the 
participants included various United Nations (UN) agencies of the UN Country 
Team (UNCT), the European Union (EU) as well as a number of international 
NGOs monitored and supported the constitutional process wherever possible.110 
The UN support was conducted through the UNCT and its agencies comprising 
of the Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), under the 
auspices of the UN Development Programme (UNDP). These international 
participants concluded a co-operation agreement with the NCA to support the 
constitutional building process in Tunisia. The focus of the agreement between 
the UN and Tunisia was to lay a legitimate foundation for the creation of a 
new social contract not only from an internal perspective but also from an 
international perspective as the entire international community was focussing 
on the constitutional-making process. The result of the various participants 
would have the effect of the process being observed as being transparent 
107 Besides the UGTT, numerous human rights, lawyers, women and other civil 
society organisations were and still committed in pushing forward the transition 
process in their respective fields. Under the previous regime, the possibilities for 
civil society activities were limited, and often restricted by censorship and/or 
repression. After the Arab uprising, a lacuna was created for the manoeuvrability 
which resulted in the explosions of participants in the constitutional process.
108 Tamaru, Holt-Ivry & O’Reilly, ‘Beyond Revolution: How Women Influenced 
Constitution Making in Tunisia,’ http:// www.inclusivesecurity.org, accessed on 
19 October 2018.
109 Tamaru, Holt-Ivry & O’Reilly, ‘Beyond Revolution: How Women Influenced 
Constitution Making in Tunisia.’
110 Shaqoura & Kristiansen, ‘Islam and Human Rights: The Constitutional Debate in 
Tunisia.’
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and inclusive constitutional building process in Tunisia. Some members of 
‘the quartet’ were accused of as being subservient to their economic interest 
rather than to its core objectives.111 It is for that reason not exclusively that the 
Ennahda party leadership and other political parties refused to acknowledge 
the legitimacy of the quartet. 
The events that have triggered the departure of former president Ben Ali, has 
been closely followed by the OHCHR.112 Navi Pillay, UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, announced that a team of experience officers are to be 
deployed to Tunisia, to assist the country in achieving its human rights 
aspirations, and those who has sacrificed will not have been in vain.113 The 
roles played by the OHCHR114 and the UNCT was to lobby for the inclusion 
of advocacy activities relating to human rights standards and principles to 
accompany the draft text of the constitution leading up to the final draft. To 
attain this goal, a joint brief by the OHCHR and the UNCT prescribing the 
application of international human rights standards affording human rights and 
the rule of law to all members of the NCA in 2012.115 The OHCHR commented 
111 De Silva de Alwis, Mnasri & Ward, ‘Women and the Making of the Tunisian 
Constitution,’ http://acholarship.law.upenn.edu, accessed on 19 October 2017.
112 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 
‘Report of the OHCHR Assessment Mission to Tunisia 26 January 2011 to 2 
February 2011,’ http://www.ohchr.org/encountries/menaregions, accessed on 19 
October 2018.
113 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 
‘Report of the OHCHR Assessment Mission to Tunisia 26 January 2011 to 2 
February 2011.’
114 The purpose of the OHCHR was to, explore possibilities for the advancement of 
human rights in Tunisia in light of the extraordinary turn of events, gain a first-
hand understanding of human rights challenges and to discuss with a broad range 
of actors, including the Transitional Government, civil society groups and the UN 
Country Team, how OHCRH can assist the people of Tunisia in strengthening 
respect for all human rights in the country, and report to the HC on its observation 
and recommendations. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR), ‘Report of the OHCHR Assessment Mission to Tunisia 
26 January 2011 to 2 February 2011.’
115 Shaqoura & Kristiansen, ‘Islam and Human Rights: The Constitutional Debate in 
Tunisia.’ 
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on certain provisions of preliminary drafts and offered recommendations to 
NCA to integrate international standards in its process.116
The role played by women in the constitutional building process cannot 
be underestimated. The Tunisian Association of Democratic Women (ATFD) 
and The Association of Tunisian Women for Research on Development 
(AFTURD), both established in 1989, during the Ben Ali regime became 
powerhouses of activism when Ben Ali was ousted.117 The constitutional 
process created a public space for women’s movements, as a result women 
were well represented in the NCA decision-making committees, sadly, only a 
few women were appointed to significant positions of leadership.118 Although, 
women only occupied a few positions of authority, many were appointed as 
deputies of the various constituent committees relating to drafting process 
under specific constitutional themes, of interest, the only committee headed 
by a woman was the committee on human rights and liberties, which dealt 
with issues relating to women’s rights.119 Women’s organisations also acted as 
effective poll-watchers, constantly monitoring the NCA and highlighting any 
anomalies in the drafting process making women and women’s organisations 
more visible. 
A case in point is South Africa, the participation of women and their 
organizations played a crucial role for the amalgamation of women’s 
116 Geneva International Centre for Justice, ‘Tunisia’s UPR-2017 (conferences-
meetings/upr-sessions/1070-tunisia-s-upr-2017),’ http://www.gicj.org/oppositions 
-opinions, accessed on 19 October 2018. For example, equality and non-
discrimination: the OHCHR recommended criminalizing racism, in line with 
international commitments. The country team reported that article 250 of the 
Criminal Code criminalized sexual relations between the persons of the same sex 
and expressed concern for cases of discrimination against the members of the 
Amazigh minority, human rights and counter-terrorism: the 2015 mission report, 
the Special Rapporteur on torture stated that they heard that tens or even hundreds 
of individuals had been subject to ill-treatment or even torture in the context of 
counter-terrorism operations. Right to life, liberty and security of the person: 
the Committee against torture was concerned about reports of incommunicado 
detention before arrest had been officially registered in cases relating counter-
terrorism activities and in which claims of torture had been made.
117 De Silva de Alwis, Mnasri & Ward, ‘Women and the Making of the Tunisian 
Constitution.’ 
118 De Silva de Alwis, Mnasri & Ward, ‘Women and the Making of the Tunisian 
Constitution.’ 
119 De Silva de Alwis, Mnasri & Ward, ‘Women and the Making of the Tunisian 
Constitution.’
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movements where previously they were either non-existent or played a limited 
role in civil society. In 1992, the South African Women’s National Coalition 
embarked upon stimulating public awareness and creating a platform for the 
discussions surrounding the rights of women.120 During the transition period 
in South Africa, this organization highlighted several areas of concern for the 
new South Africa, for example, inclusivity in the decision making process, 
awareness and the promotion of women’s rights, gender equality and the 
uniting of women.121 
Around 1994, the South African Constituent Assembly (SACA) in the early 
stages of the drafting process of a new constitution started out to include a 
broad base participatory platform which was grounded in three major points, 
inclusivity, accessibility and transparency.122 These included, an educational 
push using billboards, newspapers, radio, television and hotline to inform 
and educate the public about constitutional issues and the right of the public 
to participate in the constitutional building process.123 Of note, more than 
one thousand educational workshops were organised within a period of one 
year.124 This process allowed members of the SACA, to meet members of 
the community and to address the concerns of South African people. Public 
consultations were held relating to specific issues, such the Bill of Rights, the 
judiciary as well as the administration of the way forward for South Africa.125 
The SACA held a two year deliberation which was transparent and included 
the input of the all South Africans, in part due to the push by women and the 
South African Women’s National Coalition Movement.
120 De Silva de Alwis, Mnasri & Ward, ‘Women and the Making of the Tunisian 
Constitution.’ 
121 Murphy, ‘Constitutional Rights Discourse: Canadian and South African Feminist 
Engagements,’ in Women Making Constitutions: New Politics and Comparative 
Perspectives, ed. Alexandra D & Hart V (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 
21-23.
122 Albertyn, ‘Towards Substantive Representation: Women and Politics in South 
Africa,’ in Women Making Constitutions: New Politics and Comparative 
Perspectives, ed. Alexandra D & Hart V (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 
99-117. 
123 Brandt, ‘Constitutional-Making and Reforms: Options for the Process,’ http://
constitutionalmakingforpeace.org, accessed on 19 October 2018.
124 De Silva de Alwis, Mnasri & Ward, ‘Women and the Making of the Tunisian 
Constitution.’ 
125 De Silva de Alwis, Mnasri & Ward, ‘Women and the Making of the Tunisian 
Constitution.’
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THE CONSTITUTION AND ISLAM 
From the beginning of Tunisia’s constitutional transition, the identity of the 
state would be a contentious issue. The dilemma concerned the cohesion of 
the various elements that carved out the Tunisian state and how that identity 
could find an alignment with the rights and freedoms that would eventually 
form part of the constitution. The right to freedom of religion or belief 
is one of many foundational principles of international law (and in some 
constitutions globally) and it would be essential that it is protected and explicit 
in constitutional drafts and transition.126 This right is codified by article 18 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)127 as well as article 18 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),128 is a 
commodious right encompassing a large number of issues. 
As early as the 1970’s, the Ennahda party has been an opposition tool to 
post-independence Tunisia one the most contentious issue was the role of 
religion in the state and wider society.129 Party members had openly disagreed 
which they viewed as an anti-Islamic government and attacking its secularist 
policies. Of note, during the Ben Ali presidency the Ennahda party was the 
political tension that led to trails, imprisonment and ultimately the exile of 
Ennahda members.130 Post Jasmine revolution, the issue of religion within 
the public sphere become more prominent resulting in victory of Ennahda in 
the elections, and thrusting forward the role of religion in the constitutional 
building process.
126 The Carter Center, ‘The Carter Congratulates Tunisia’s National Constituent 
Assembly on Final Draft of Constitution and Urges Safeguards for Human Rights.’ 
127 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), GOAR 3rd Session, 
Resolutions, (Part 1) UN Doc A/810, adopted 10 December 1948. 
128 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res 2200 (XXI), UN 
GAOR 21st Session, Supp No 16, UN Doc A/6316 (1996) UNTS 171, adopted 16 
December 1966.
129 Karray, ‘The National Constituent Assembly, Historical Lessons and Contemporary 
Stakes,’ Right to Nonviolence Tunisia Constitutional E-Forum, http://www.
rightononviolence.org/mecf/mr-bassem-karray, accessed on 19 October 2018.
130 The Ben Ali presidency set out to prevent religious influences on Tunisian society 
by prohibiting the establishment of religious-fused parties by observing and 
monitoring Islamist militants.
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The Tunisian constitution of 1959,131 makes mention of Islam, though in 
a dampened context, in a way that it acknowledges Islam as the religion of 
Tunisia as contained in article 1, and was not expressly stated as primary or 
formal source of law.132 Reference to Islam is also mentioned in the preamble 
and article 38 therefore inferences may be drawn from the 1959 constitution that 
Islam remained to a certain degree neutral on the issue of religion.133 According 
to Charfi, a legal scholar, article 1 of the 1959 constitution, indicated that the 
Tunisian majority were Muslims and as such indicated it to be so and that the 
state did not ignore the sociological realities or certain peculiarities relating to 
Islam.134
The question of how to interpret article 1 of the old constitution into the 
new constitution was the subject of much deliberation in the NCA, the media, 
and civil society in Tunisia. The preamble of the first draft submitted in August 
2012, referred to the aims of Islam as a source of inspiration and stood firm 
on the Islamic identity of the country.135 The preamble of first draft of 2012 
therefore acknowledges the state as protector and guarantor of religion as well 
as the freedoms of conscience and exercise of faith. In addition, the preamble 
also acknowledges the sacredness and neutrality of sites of worship against 
partisan propaganda. Furthermore, the provision that ‘Islam is the religion of 
the state’ imposing that this provision is exempted from all possible review.136 
131 The Constitution of Tunisia - “In the Name of the people, We, Habib Bourguiba, 
President of the Republic of Tunisia, Considering the Decree of December 29, 
1955 (14 Djoumada 1 1375) establishing the Constituent National Assembly, 
Considering the decision of the Constituent National Assembly of July 25, 
1957 (26 Dhoul-hidja 1376), and With the approval of the Constituent National 
Assembly, Promulgate the following Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia”, the 
content which reads as follows.
132 The Republic of Tunisia, The Constitution of Tunisia of 1959, article 1 which 
reads: “Tunisia is a free, independent and sovereign state. Its religion is Islam. Its 
language is Arabic and its type of government is the Republic.”
133 Chapter III, The Executive Power, article 38 which reads: “The President of the 
Republic is the Head of State. His religion shall be Islam.” 
134 Charfi, Islam and Liberty: The Historical Misunderstanding (London: Zed Books, 
2005), 12-13.
135 Shaqoura & Kristiansen, ‘Islam and Human Rights: The Constitutional Debate in 
Tunisia.’ Thirty articles of the first draft were submitted with alternative language, 
ranging from two to five options for a single article.
136 Article 145 of the 2014 constitution posits that the preamble is an integral part 
of the constitution, in addition, article 146, reads that the dispositions of the 
constitution are part of and explained as a harmonious whole.
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The second draft was submitted in December of 2012, declares that the 
constitution will be founded on the fundamental principles (thawabit)137 of 
Islam and that its aims are openness and moderation founded on the heritage of 
the Tunisian people as well as illuminating the Islamic and Arab identity of the 
country. However this is softened by making reference to the universal values 
as well as to the historical and cultural heritage of the Tunisian people. Article 
4, of the second draft also recognises Islam as religion of country just as the 
first draft.138 In addition, article 4, also recognises the state as the guarantor of 
religion, freedom of belief, the practice of religion including the protector of 
the sacred and the guarantor relating to neutrality of worship sites in relation 
to partisan propaganda.139 
The third draft was submitted in April 2013, included article 1 and 
acknowledges the role of Islam as Tunisia’s main religion. As in the second 
draft of December 12, the third draft of April 2013, it stresses that the 
constitution will be founded on ‘fundamental principles (thawabit) found in 
Islam’ expressing that the constitution will characterised by openness and 
moderation. In addition, it refers to the universal human rights principles as 
noble human values with the only caveat, that these human rights principles 
are consistent with the Tunisian people culture specificities. It seems that 
the April 2013 draft edges further that its predecessors insisting on cultural 
specificity. The constitutional designers of this draft argue that inspiration for 
the above was founded by Tunisia’s cultural heritage accumulated throughout 
history, the enlightened reformist movement based on elements of their Arab-
Muslim identity, the universal achievements of human civilisation and the 
their commitment to the national achievements of Tunisia as a whole.140 Of 
note, these provisions which are to founded in the preamble amongst human 
rights activists, argue that these provisions found in the preamble could have 
negative connotations for the universality of human rights.
137 Etymologically, in Arabic the word thawabit refers more to ‘constant principles’ 
and does not share the same root with the word ‘fundamentalist’ (ussouliy derived 
from ussouls meaning fundament). The translation may therefore be misleading as 
it may suggest a more direct link between the wording used to translate thawabit 
and ‘fundamentalism’ as understood in its most current meaning. According to 
Shaqoura and Kristiansen, such a link is not obvious in Arabic. 
138 Article 4, of the second draft of the Tunisian constitution of 2012 (draft).
139 Article 4, of the second draft of the Tunisian constitution of 2012 (draft).
140 Shaqoura & Kristiansen, ‘Islam and Human Rights: The Constitutional Debate in 
Tunisia.’
The Tunisian Constitutional Transition and Debates: Islam, Women 
and Other Actors in the Wake of the Post Jasmine Revolution
319
The fourth draft was submitted in June 2013. In this instance the preamble 
aligns itself with the Arab-Islamic identity of Tunisia. In this draft the 
designers demonstrated that they are informed by ‘the teachings/doctrines of 
Islam displaying openness and moderation, human values, the universality 
of human rights.141 In addition, also acknowledging the Tunisian peoples 
national achievements, this too forms part of the preamble.142 Again, article 1 
is maintained as Islam is recognised as the main religion of Tunisia. 
The committee on consensus established in June 2013, reached a preliminary 
agreement as well as allowing further amendments which were proposed. The 
issue again centred, around Islam and its place in the preamble. According 
to Shaqoura and Kristiansen these included amendments to the preamble 
which refers to a process being based ‘on the teachings of Islam’ which were 
replaced by a tempered provision underlying ‘the attachment of our people to 
the Doctrine of Islam”.143 It was also argued the retraction of article 141 which 
referred to Islam as the religion of the state.144 Although, article 141, highlights 
several provisions that could not be amended, this was to be reformatted by 
two similar provisions, for example, article 1 ‘Tunisia is a free, independent 
and sovereign state, Islam is the religion, Arabic is the language and it is a 
republic’, and Tunisia is a civil state based on citizenship and ruled by the will 
of the people as well as adherence to the rule of law, which was place outside 
the realm of amendments. These are as a result of the evolution of human 
rights which in part was fused by the advocacy of human rights organisations 
which in turn had the impact of solidifying of certain freedoms and liberties in 
the final draft. Disagreements over the June 2013 draft led to the creation of a 
Committee of Consensus (CC).145 The Committee of Consensus was responsible 
for the identification of contentious issues, collection and registration of views 
relating to contentious issues and to lead negotiations to resolving contentious 
issues. In addition, the Committee of Consensus and its panel assisting it 
141 The preamble to the Tunisian constitution of 2013 (draft).
142 The preamble to the Tunisian constitution of 2013 (draft).
143 Shaqoura & Kristiansen, ‘Islam and Human Rights: The Constitutional Debate in 
Tunisia.’ 
144 Article 141 states, that the following provisions may not be subject to constitutional 
amendment: Islam as the religion of the State, Arabic as the official language of 
the State, the republican system of government, the civil character of the State, the 
human rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Constitution and the number of time 
extending the presidential mandate.
145 Abdesselem, ‘The Making of A Constitution: A Look back at Tunisia’s Thorny 
Consensus-Building Process,’ http://www.constitutionnet.org, accessed on 26 
October 2018.
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with various secularist opinions could be seen as in solidifying these norms.146 
The fear or call by certain participants in the drafting process to add Islam 
as a formal source did not materialised, especially the early calls made by 
Ennahda.147 Although withdrawing its early comments relating to Islam as a 
source of any type of legislation/law, the reason could very well be that the 
characteristics of Tunisia was that it was a relatively secularised society where 
religious obligations are increasingly opined as a personal issue rather than a 
community or perhaps a clan prerogative.148 
WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND STATUS 
The status of women in Tunisia since the middle of the 1900’s, have enjoyed an 
elevated status, albeit, from a family law perspective. Therefore, one would to 
a certain degree be correct in assuming that the issue of women would not arise 
within the constitutional building process.149 Of note, the CPS was registered in 
August 1956, only five months after independence and was applied in January 
of 1957.150 The Constituent Assembly (CA) which also acted as a legislative 
body (which convened in April 1956), surprisingly the text of the CPS was not 
146 Abdesselem, ‘The Making of A Constitution: A Look back at Tunisia’s Thorny 
Consensus-Building Process.’
147 The Role of Islamic Law in Tunisia’s Constitution and Legislation, http://www.loc.
gov/law/help/tunisia.php, accessed on 9 October 2018. Some Ennahda members 
proposed a provision designating Shariah a source of legislation. Secularists and 
others opposed this as improperly Islamizing the legal regime. After significant 
discussions within the party and with others about the provisions reality, Ennahda 
announced it would not seek a Shariah reference.
148 Added to this as a framework that was characterised by a balance of power that 
did not enable the Islamist to impose their will; while they had a relative majority 
in the NCA, the government consisted of a coalition of parties, and a strong media 
and economic powers were placed outside the control of the holders of political 
might. This framework had to be taken into account during the constitutional 
phase and to the conclusion of the next elections, and could have had the impetus 
that allowed Ennahda to be more willing and creating a constitution would be 
consensual. 
149 Tamaru, Holt-Ivry & O’Reilly, ‘Beyond Revolution: How Women Influenced 
Constitution Making in Tunisia.’ 
150 Zeghal, ‘The Implicit Sharia: Established Religion and Varieties of Secularism in 
Tunisia,’ in Varieties of Religious Establishment, ed. Winnifred Fallers Sullivan & 
Lori G. Beaman (London: Ashgate, 2013), 107-130.
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debated or presented to the vote of the members of the constituent assembly.151 
Surprisingly, the CPS promulgated by Bourguiba and his closest aides was 
removed from the deliberative sphere of the constituent assembly.152
The CPS underwent several amendments and created conditions that 
would have permitted women to fulfil their role in society in many aspects. 
These rights included the prohibition of polygyny and repudiation the legal 
right for women to ask for divorce, the establishment of a minimum age for 
marriage, the required consent of both parties to marriage have all furthered 
and strengthened the freedom and social status of women in Tunisia (there 
were areas where the CPS did fall short).153 However, the status of women in 
Tunisia did not escape the contentious arena from the constitutional building 
process. Women’s organisations as well as human rights activist postulated 
concerns about the possibility of certain gains women acquired may be eroded 
as a consequence of the rise of Islamism in general as well as the dominant role 
of Ennahda in the NCA. 
Of note is article 28 of the August 2012 draft which refers to role of men and 
women as being complementarity to each other. The drafting of this provision 
by the constitutional sub-committee approved the wording by a vote of 12 to 8, 
“The State guarantees the protection of women’s rights and support of its [their] 
achievements as a real partner of man in building a nation. Their roles within 
the family are complementary”.154 For liberal women, the complementarity 
provision concretised the threat of Ennahda, for all its affirmations, sought to 
roll back women’s hard fought achievements and to dominant the Tunisian 
society. International observers of the constitutional building process, such 
as Human Rights Watch, the Carter Center, and the Special Rapportuers and 
working groups from the UN Human Rights Council came out in opposition 
of article 28.155 These organisations postulated that the complementarity 
provision is an ambiguous concept, formatted on women’s relationship to men 
rather than their universal human rights, and thus an inferior standard than full 
151 Zeghal, ‘The Implicit Sharia: Established Religion and Varieties of Secularism in 
Tunisia,’ 107-130.
152 Zeghal, ‘The Implicit Sharia: Established Religion and Varieties of Secularism in 
Tunisia,’ 107-130.
153 Salem, ‘Tunisia.’ 
154 Feuer, ‘Islam and Democracy in Practice: Tunisia’s Ennahda Nine Months,’ http://
brandeis.edu, accessed on 20 October 2018.
155 Tamaru, Holt-Ivry & O’Reilly, ‘Beyond Revolution: How Women Influenced 
Constitution Making in Tunisia.’ 
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gender equality.156 The sustained pressure from all quarters on the NCA, article 
20 of the June 2013 draft recognised the equality of men and women in rights 
and duties, equality before the law without discrimination, however, mainly 
in the qualities as citizens of society.157 Article 20 of the June 2013 draft, 
subsequently was adopted in the 2014 constitution as article 21.158 Article 46 of 
final draft provides “The state commits to protect women’s accrued rights and 
work to strengthen and develop those rights, The state guarantees the equality 
of opportunities between women and men to have access to all levels of 
responsibility in all domains, The state works to attain parity between women 
and men in elected Assemblies, The state shall take all necessary measures in 
order to eradicate violence against women”.159 
BLASPHEMY AND ITS RELATION TO THE FREEDOM OF RELIGION, 
EXPRESSION AND CONSCIENCE 
The affirmation of Islam as the religion of Tunisia on the one side, while on 
the other side the constitution which affirmed the state as the protector and 
guarantor of freedoms of conscience and exercise of faith, including the sacred 
and neutrality of sites of worship against any partisan propaganda, sparked 
debates concerning the potential tension of these provisions. The reason for 
debating this potential mix was that a series of events relating to freedom of 
expression in which various artworks viewed by Islamists as blasphemous and 
certain sites of worship were attacked.160 
Activists argued that the hypocrisy of the state to act as guarantor of the 
freedom of conscious could create a limitation of the freedom of expression as 
well as potential cloak for unwanted state interference relating to the freedom 
of conscious and creation.161 
156 Tamaru, Holt-Ivry & O’Reilly, ‘Beyond Revolution: How Women Influenced 
Constitution Making in Tunisia.’
157 Shaqoura & Kristiansen, ‘Islam and Human Rights: The Constitutional Debate in 
Tunisia.’ 
158 The Tunisian Constitution of 2014, article 21.
159 Tamaru, Holt-Ivry & O’Reilly, ‘Beyond Revolution: How Women Influenced 
Constitution Making in Tunisia.’ 
160 Certain artistic expressions and sites of worship had been explicitly threatened as 
well as the destruction of those places of worship.
161 Shaqoura & Kristiansen, ‘Islam and Human Rights: The Constitutional Debate in 
Tunisia.’ 
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The debate relating to place a ban on blasphemy, in which Ennahda 
members proposed initially, proposing a criminal prohibition applying to 
other Abrahamic faiths.162 After deliberations with others, Ennahda members 
withdrew the stipulation that blasphemy be criminalized, although provisions 
protecting religion remained in earlier drafts.163 The exposure of this debate 
stimulated changes to article 6 which now provides that the ‘State is the 
guardian of religion’, protects the ‘sacred’ and prohibits ‘any offences thereto’ 
and as prohibiting takfir (incitement to hatred).164 Civil society organisations 
critique these provisions as being sketchy and open to abuse as putting a noose 
around the neck of freedom of speech and religion as well as blasphemy.165 
After repeated debates whether or not to constitutionally prohibit blasphemy, 
the NCA adopted a provision in the final constitution prohibiting ‘any harm 
to the sacred, campaigns of accusing those of apostasy, incitement to hatred 
or violence’.166 In addition, the final text makes reference to insult, abuse of 
vilification, denial, accusation and defamation as well as guaranteeing the 
neutrality of mosques and sites of worship against any partisan instrumentalism 
and puts forward attempts to broadcasts the values of moderation and tolerance.167 
To correct what may be perceived as an off-centre view of the European 
system of dealing with religion, democracy, as well as human rights, it would 
be prudent to gain insight of the following practices globally.168 The following 
examples may well provide that the European countries have perhaps fallen 
short of the standard that Tunisia achieved. Surprisingly, some of these 
provisions have received strong critique within the Tunisian constitutional 
context, whereas some of these are still very much alive on the European 
continent. The following examples are not set forward to concertize a strong 
162 Aswad, ‘The Role of Religion in Constitutions Emerging from Arab Spring 
Revolutions,’ Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, vol. 16, no. 1 (2015): 
159-169.
163 Aswad, ‘The Role of Religion in Constitutions Emerging from Arab Spring 
Revolutions,’ 159-169.
164 Aswad, ‘The Role of Religion in Constitutions Emerging from Arab Spring 
Revolutions,’ 159-169.
165 Guellali, ‘The Constitution-Making Process in Tunisia,’ The Carter Center, http://
www.cartercenter.org, accessed on 30 October 2018.
166 Article 6 of the Tunisian Constitution of 2014.
167 Shaqoura & Kristiansen, ‘Islam and Human Rights: The Constitutional Debate in 
Tunisia.’ 
168 Bousbih & Yaalaoui, ‘The Interplay of Politics and Religion in the New Tunisian 
Constitution: A Legal Analysis,’ in The Tunisian Constitutional Process: Main 
Actors and Key Issues (Duisburg, Germany: Global Dialogues, 2015), 16-23.
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or weak case for religious representation in state affairs they are intended to 
awaken us that the progression towards liberal democracy is a continuing 
process and the various religious permutations which can be uncovered.169 
In 2010, a report by the Venice Commission170 comments that blasphemy is a 
recognised offence in Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy, Lietchenstein, 
the Netherlands as well as San Marino, and that the penalty incurred for the 
above is usually a term of imprisonment (ranging from three to six months) 
with a two year sentence for malicious blasphemy in Greece. In countries such 
as Andorra, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Spain, Finland, Germany, 
Greece, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Norway, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, Switzerland, Turkey, and the 
Ukraine, recognise insult as an offence.171 In 2007 in its Recommendation 
1805, the Parliamentary Assemble of the Council of Europe commented that; 
“With regard to blasphemy, religious insult and hate speech against persons 
on the ground of their religion, the state is responsible for determining what 
should count as criminal offences within the limits imposed by the case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights.172 
In the judgement of I. A. v Turkey 2005 (42571/98),173 the European Court 
of Human Rights ruled that the Turkish authorities had not violated the 
right to freedom of expression when it convicted a publisher for producing 
material insulting to Prophet Muḥammad and the Holy Qu’ran. The court in 
this instance had to weigh the right of the plaintiff to free expression against 
169 Böckenförde, ‘The Dynamics of Comprehensive Constitution-building: Religion 
and the Concept of Twin Tolerations in Tunisia,’ 24-35. 
170 Venice Commission, ‘Blasphemy, Insult and Hatred: Finding Answers in a 
Democratic Society,’ Science and Technique of Democracy Series, no. 47 
(Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2010), 19. Co-operation between the Venice 
Commission and the Southern Mediterranean countries started before the 
Arab spring. Algeria and Morocco became full members in 2007, and Tunisia 
in 2010. The Venice Commission co-operates with countries of the Southern 
Mediterranean region in areas such as, democratic institutions and fundamental 
rights, constitutional justice and ordinary justice, and elections, referendums and 
political parties. 
171 In Germany and Portugal, a legal disturbance of the peace must also have been 
caused for the relevant action to qualify as an offence.
172 Böckenförde, ‘The Dynamics of Comprehensive Constitution-building: Religion 
and the Concept of Twin Tolerations in Tunisia,’ 24-35.
173 A. I v. Turkey 2005 (42571/98) European Court of Human Rights, http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int, accessed on 27 October 2018.
The Tunisian Constitutional Transition and Debates: Islam, Women 
and Other Actors in the Wake of the Post Jasmine Revolution
325
the right of others to have their freedom of thought, conscience, and religion 
respected. The court came to the realisation that certain passages did indeed 
constitute an abusive attack on the primary sources of Islam. From a Western 
perspective, according to Stepan, a legal scholar, as late as 1995, all mature 
democracies in Western Europe in which Lutheranism was the dominant faith 
had an established church (Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway).174 
In the United Kingdom, the monarch is the Supreme Governor of the 
Church of England. Twenty six seats in the UK parliament’s second chamber 
are reserved to Anglican bishops.175 By constitutional design and due to his/her 
role in the appointment process of the two most senior archbishops within the 
Church of England, the Prime Minister should not be perceived as processing 
bias against the established church.176 The drafters of the Malta constitution177 a 
country no more than 300km’s from Tunisia, contains the following provisions 
in its constitution, “The religion of Malta is the Roman Catholic Apostolic 
Religion. The authorities of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church have the 
duty and the right to teach which principles are right and wrong. Religious 
teaching of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Faith shall be provided in all State 
schools as part of compulsory education”.178 
Surprisingly, these constitutional provisions, Malta was considered to meet 
the criteria for accession to the European Union (the Copenhagen criteria), one 
of which is ‘stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and respect for as well as the protection of minorities.179 
174 Stepan, ‘Tunisia’s Transition and the Twin Tolerations,’ Journal of Democracy 
(2012): 89-103.
175 Böckenförde, ‘The Dynamics of Comprehensive Constitution-building: Religion 
and the Concept of Twin Tolerations in Tunisia,’ 24-35.
176 Böckenförde, ‘The Dynamics of Comprehensive Constitution-building: Religion 
and the Concept of Twin Tolerations in Tunisia,’ 24-35. Under the Roman Catholic 
Relief Act of 1829, section 17, and the Jews Relief Act of 1858, section 4, no 
Roman Catholic or Jew may advise the sovereign on ecclesiastical matters. In an 
individual of either of these religious faiths were to occupy the office of Prime 
Minister, the ecclesiastical appointment procedure might therefore need to be 
adjusted. 
177 Article 2 of the Malta Constitution, states the following: 2. (1) “The religion of 
Malta is the Roman Catholic Apostolic Religion”, see also articles 2(2) and (3).
178 Article 2 of the Malta Constitution.
179 Böckenförde, ‘The Dynamics of Comprehensive Constitution-building: Religion 
and the Concept of Twin Tolerations in Tunisia,’ 24-35. 
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CONCLUSION 
Three years after the Jasmin Revolution and several drafts later, the Tunisian 
National Constituent Assembly (NCA) adopted an all-embracing constitutional 
text, accommodating the divergent Tunisian views while at the same time 
lending itself largely to a coherent interpretation. For the Tunisian people the 
path to constitutionalism proper is in its early stages and it up to society as well 
as the relevant institutions to concretise what they have accomplished so far 
and to begin era of constitutionalism founded on the constitutional text. From 
an international perspective the international actors can assist the Tunisian 
people towards progression of constitutionalism. In addition, the international 
actors and activists can lend support to domestic actors as well as to reflect 
on the experiences of the European experiences. As the European examples 
mentioned above has shown that it is quite possible that constitutional 
provisions reflecting religious and cultural identities of a country to be included 
in a constitution which in turn may form part of a constitutionalist disposition, 
without prejudice to democracy, the rule of law, human rights and/or respect 
of minorities. 
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